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Article 9

CONVERSATION
AND THE INFINITE
LONG RUN
Anne Freadman
Conversations on Peirce: Reals and
Ideals by Douglas R. Anderson
and Carl R. Housman. New
York: Fordham University
Press, 2012. Pp. 270. $95.00 cloth,
$40 paper.

Conversation is a significant notion
in the work of Charles S. Peirce:
from his view of the history of philosophy as the conversations of the
philosophers to his account of the
sign as necessarily addressed, from
his understanding of hypothesis as
question to his construal of science
as taking place in a community of
inquiry, there are always (minimally) two voices—two sources
of ideas—engaged attentively
with each other and committed
to discovering the consequences
of their exchange. There is much
disagreement, and much doubt, in
such a process, and—as for Peirce’s
emblematic two tramps who leave
messages for each other along the
road of inquiry—much building
on the work of predecessors. In his
own exchanges with colleagues and
friends, Peirce was a fine reviewer
of the work of other people, and
the evidence shows that his discussions of their work—often in richly
reflective letters—mattered deeply
to his correspondents. Alongside
these facts, we might set this other:
much of his writing takes the form
of series of lecture series or papers;
though he wished to produce a system in the form of a philosophical
treatise, it is clear that these more
local modes with their invitation
to immediate uptake suited him
better. Through them, he had the
greatest impact during his life, and,
while it is standard practice now
to consult the mass of manuscript
writings for buried treasures, it is
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they that show how Peirce was in
constant dialogue with himself.
As Manley Thompson demonstrated many years ago,1 Peirce’s
habit was to explore in one series
of papers or lectures a problem
thrown up in the previous one.
Even in silent solitary meditation, he writes, one’s thoughts are
addressed to one’s self of the next
instant. It is the pervasive theme of
conversation along with this habit
of d
 ialogue that make not only the
title, but the conception, of this
book so felicitous.
It consists of twelve chapters,
each the upshot of conversations
between the two principal authors
or between one of them with other
colleagues. Divided into three
parts—Conversations I on the
metaphysics, Conversations II on
the epistemology, and Conversations
III on Peirce and religion—the
book is remarkable for overcoming its multiple occasions in a
cable of interwoven threads: closure vs. openness, the infinitely
long run, the relations of “chance,
love, and logic,” and continuity
are the Peircean themes par excellence whose bearing on standard
philosophical topics is continually
demonstrated.
The most satisfying chapters
are those examining conversations between Peirce and other
philosophers—from the past

(Berkeley), with his contemporaries
(Josiah Royce, John Dewey,
William James, and Karl Pearson),

and discussions of his work by
ours (Joseph Margolis and Richard
Rorty). The compare-and-contrast
method enables the authors to
draw on their shared formidable
knowledge of Peirce’s writings,
illuminating the issues with an
admirable combination of textual
precision and transversal understanding. Two painstaking chapters by Housman, on the “dynamic
object” and the beginning of interpretation, take us to the heart of the
difficulties in assessing the relation
between Peirce’s metaphysics and
his semiotic: no reader of Peirce
can avoid this matter and, while
these topics have been discussed
frequently, their juxtaposition
with the debates regarding the history of Pragmatism is particularly
revealing. The end of the book
consists of an eloquent case, made
by Anderson, for not bracketing
out Peirce’s theism, leading to a
final chapter staging a response
from Peirce to fundamentalism.
This is a pragmatic use of Peirce,
making a pair with Anderson’s
account of Peirce’s objections to
Pearson’s social utilitarian views
of science. Both chapters have a
strongly polemical undercurrent;
they are addressed firmly to the
public forum, and both rest on
the philosophical work done in the
other chapters to demonstrate how
what I call the Peircean thematic
(mentioned earlier) helps to cut
through the impasses of contemporary social debate.

ON CONVERSATIONS ON PEIRCE
The conversations with other
philosophers serve to set up the
terms in which the discussions
of the later chapters are pursued.
Thus, Peirce’s review of Fraser’s
edition of Berkeley identifies the
crucial contrast between realism
and nominalism, the latter being
the view that reality consists exclusively of singulars, that it is independent of mind and external to
it. This is the view presupposed in
what has been called the so-called
gap between representation and the
real, a view against which Peirce
argued throughout his work.
Peirce sets out from here on a quest
to define an account of representation in which the knowing of an
object and the object of knowledge
are continuous, though not assimilable, with one another. This will
be a nonidealist realism that can
include singular existents alongside
the postulate of generality, hence
authorizing science’s quest for laws
of nature without abandoning the
possibility of a world that can surprise inquiry. The second chapter sets out to study the ways in
which the early pragmatists influenced one another (16), as against
their “tendency” to polemical selfidentity. Peirce, writes Anderson,
marked out a “middle-ground”
between Royce and Dewey in
respect of two key issues: the issue
of method and the consequent
assessment of his realism. Thus,
Royce considers that reality is “a
fixed, unified whole and the story
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to be told about it—the truth—[is]
equally fixed and whole” (22). As
against this, Dewey takes an experimentalist position in which reality is the product of a transactional
account of experience, arguing that
“the empiricist’s epistemological
concern about whether an experiencer can reach some external
world is unnecessary because it is in
experience that we do find nature”
(62–63). Thus, the human history
of inquiry is in a relation of reciprocal constraint with the natural history of the world. But Dewey, who
inclined more towards a historicist
understanding of the outcomes of
science than did Peirce, was also
inclined to proclaim the “disinterest” of pragmatism in ontology and
metaphysics (36). It is this aspect of
Dewey’s thought that provides the
central plank of Richard Rorty’s
repudiation of Peirce. But where,
for Rorty, the “social conversation is
the only source of constraint on . . .
further conversation” (69), Dewey
“argued minimally for something
more” (64), since not to do so would
involve a return to nominalism.
Hence, Dewey “never relinquished
his belief that inquirers were constrained by the real” (60), and his
two central affinities with Peircean
realism were “his belief in the reality of habits and in the reality of
possibility” (34).
Were we to set aside the question of the real, we would be left
with an outright constructivism
such as our authors find in Joseph
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Margolis’s assessment of Peirce
(chapter 3), as well as in the radical
pragmatism of Rorty. As we discover in chapter 4, the importance
of conversation can be overstated.
For Rorty, “philosophy is conversation that constructs stories about
the way things are” (68). But Peirce
would view Rorty as a nominalist
for whom no general is real. Now
the problem for Peirce in nominalism is that it recognizes as reality
only an inchoate bunch of singular
facts. But if “there are no real laws
or generals in the cosmos, then
there can be no heading toward
truth even as an ideal or regulative hope” (106); scientific practice would be self-contradictory,
unable to give a coherent account
of itself. Peirce cannot tolerate any
practice of philosophy that takes no
account of the practice of science;
indeed, he considered the advances
of nineteenth-century science to be
central to a principled reworking of
metaphysics and epistemology. The
question we are asking when we
ask what is real and how we know
it changes as a result. Induction is
promoted above deduction in the
actual conduct of scientific investigation, with the result that truth
is modalized—probabilistic rather
than absolute. The theory of evolution demonstrates the need to
take into account the ever-changing dynamism of nature and to
abandon the static views characteristic of both nominalism and
Platonism. Significant in this shift

from a static and absolute view of
reality is the operation of chance,
evident in geology, in evolutionary
biology, and in statistics—a field in
which Peirce himself made a major
contribution. Likewise, experimental science demonstrates the
self-
correcting nature of inquiry.
We get things wrong, frequently
and demonstrably, but we cannot
conduct inquiry without believing that there is a right answer
and, hence, without the means to
detect error (and without a way of
accounting for these means).
Peirce’s realism holds that there
are real habits in nature; they are the
way existents behave. Regularity is
subject to the operations of chance
and to the infinite variability of similars. As Dewey puts it in Experience
and Nature (1925), “Unless nature
had regular habits, persistent ways,
so compacted that they time, measure, and give rhythm and recurrence to transitive flux, meanings,
recognizable characters, could not
be” (65). It also holds that the
nature of reality is relational and
continuous. In c hapter 6, Anderson
discusses the proposition that this
dimension is not just posited theoretically, but that it enters into experience through perception. This is
a position identified with William
James and given the name “radical empiricism.” The chapter is
devoted to investigating the points
of agreement between Peirce and
James in this matter. While Peirce
insisted that mind is continuous,

ON CONVERSATIONS ON PEIRCE
not contained discretely in individual brains, it is also important
for him to argue that individual
experience is a driver of collective
inquiry, for, without this, “mere”
conversation would take over the
process. However, this entails a
modification of the tenets of empiricism. The modification turns on
two principal points: First, perception for Peirce is not a series of discrete events; it is a process whereby
the percept accedes to judgment
and thus to inquiry, all stages of
this process being fallible, subject
to testing and correction.2 Second,
that which we perceive cannot be
confined to “particular or singular
entities or qualia” (103); we must
be able to perceive relations and
continuity. Laws must be features
of human experience as such:
“[U]nder Peirce’s version of perception, the reality of generals and
of laws makes an appearance not
only at the end of inquiry but in
the very perceptions from which
inquiry springs” (108). Only on
some such basis can Peirce make
sense of “the possibility and the
importance of a history of inquiry
that is capable of development and
self-correction” (108).
It is not only the findings of
scientific research that affect the
work of philosophy; importantly
for Peirce, it is its technical
methods. In experimental science, we do not deal with raw
sense impressions, but with data
manipulated for observation. This
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manipulation—by instruments, let
us say rain gauges, weathercocks,
or microscopes (these are common
examples adduced by Peirce)—
mediates the rawness of the world,
making it available for chemical
and physical investigation, and
for the sophisticated techniques of
measuring and counting in which
Peirce himself was a specialist.
What we see when we measure the
curvature of the earth’s surface by
using the specialized instruments
developed by Peirce the “pendulum
swinger” is quite different from
what we see with the naked eye.
The issue of perception changes as
a result of taking such things into
account in our reading of Peirce,
but how he himself would have
articulated discussions of natural
perception with his understanding
of mediated observation remains
a matter of conjecture. I believe
he took it for granted pervasively,
because he takes instruments to be
signs on the grounds that (a) they
mediate perception and (b) they
make material available to interpretation in a form in which it can
be processed. Anderson does not
engage in such conjecture, preferring to remain within the terms
Peirce sets. By 1903 when he delivered the Harvard Lectures that are
the subject of chapter 6,3 Peirce had
given up his scientific work and
was addressing himself exclusively
to his philosophical colleagues. He
used these lectures to set out a systematic first philosophy that could
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integrate into Pragmatism both the
formal logic he had urged on Royce
and the metaphysics he had urged
on Dewey. In them, too, he urged
the importance of a “truly scientific philosophy” and developed an
account of perception that speaks
directly to that of James, on the
one hand inflecting his speculative
phenomenology through an appeal
to empiricism and, on the other,
revising empiricism in line with his
realism.
I believe that the restatement
of the issue of perception as scientific observation suggests a solution to the problem discussed by
Housman in chapter 7: “[A]t what
stage does the pre-interpreted
begin to be interpreted, and how
does the pre-interpreted function” to constrain interpretation
(120)? In this chapter, the question
is the articulation of the “immediate object” with the “dynamic
object,” where the immediate object
is the object as interpreted, and the
dynamic object is that which initiates, exceeds, and at the same time
constrains our interpretations. It
is the condition on interpretation,
which “does not vanish” with the
sequence of immediate objects;
“otherwise revision would not
occur” (119). Housman restates his
question in several forms: the version just quoted counts as (i). I construe (ii) on the following premises:
if, as Peirce insists, an encounter with “something” is “forced
upon” us, then this encounter falls

under the category of secondness,
“which is dyadic, precognitive and
therefore pre-interpreted” (121).
(ii) How then does “secondness”
become “thirdness”; how does it
enter into semeiosis? The question
is summed up in (iii): How do percepts initiate interpretation (125)?
He suggests an answer in Peirce’s
distinction between “antecipuum”
and “ponecipuum,” which are
ways of naming stages of a process
rather than distinct classes. This
process is Housman’s answer: it
“nudge[s] interpretation from the
external side” of semeiosis (128, my
emphasis); and again “the Peircean
ideas of dynamic objects, percepts,
immediate objects, and perceptual
judgments provide a way to understand the crucial place of both sides
of the interpretation—the objective
and the intersubjective” (131, my
emphasis). The formulation seems
to me somewhat unfortunate:
while infinitesimally reduced, there
is still a purported gap between the
real and its representation. Hence
nominalism persists.
Housman’s discussion of the
issues raised in chapters 5 and 7 is
fastidious, but not entirely satisfying for this reason. However, the
issue is unresolved by Peirce himself. As Christopher Hookway
writes, Peirce was “wrestling with
issues of genuine difficulty” and
was never entirely happy with his
solutions. He suggests that Peirce
introduces the term “percipuum,”
which “fus[es] the percept and the

ON CONVERSATIONS ON PEIRCE
perceptual judgment into a single
whole,” as an attempt to prevent
the consequences of “an oversimple
dichotomy” between the “pouring
in” of sense data and the conceptual processing of those data.4 The
given of perceptual experience is a
“phenomenologically rich complex
of the sensory and the conceptual.”
The term experience is important
here. As we see in Dewey, experience is neither inside nor outside,
and in Sandra Rosenthal’s formulation “the perceptual field, as it arises
in the context of human activity, is
an ontologically thick, resisting
field of objects which are essentially
related to the interactional horizon of our world and which allow
for the very structure of the sensing
which gives access to them.”5 Note
“human” and “our.” Experience
is species-specific because perception is species-specific: my dogs do
not experience the ring on the telephone, but they do experience the
ring at the front door and respond
as to a sign, with habitual behavior. Or to contrary effect, we might
adduce the example of a bird that
attempts to fly into the reflection of
a tree in a pane of glass—an outward clash indeed, with no aspect
that can be processed semeiotically
by the bird, and hence nothing from
which it can learn. As Hookway
writes, “[A]ny length of experience, no matter how short, will
contain elements of memory and
anticipation”; the bird’s clash with
the pane of glass (even supposing
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that it survives) is not an experience
in the useful sense, whereas the
dogs’ hearing of the doorbell is.6
Housman’s discussion of the temporality of perception has much in
common with Hookway’s, despite
the contrast discerned between
them by Rosenthal.7 Hookway’s,
however, avoids the trap of hunting down the “pre-interpreted,” as
indeed does Rosenthal’s: “[W]hat
is ‘given’ at the most fundamental
level of perceptual awareness is in
fact a ‘taken’, and it incorporates
both the nature of the taking and
the nature of what is taken.”8
Brute reality is that up against
which we bump in the surprises
of experience for which the present state of our knowledge cannot
prepare us. These bumping experiences are indeed, as Housman
writes, instances of secondness. But
Peirce does not ask how secondness becomes thirdness (question
(ii)); he asks how thirdness provides
the means for designating secondness. These means are indexical,
and they are always already signs.
This does not deny the existence of
brute reality; it merely claims that
only under experience does brute
reality also partake of signhood. If
it is an object, it is object-of-a-sign,
whether this sign be a percept or
something more—or indeed less—
articulate. Hookway points out that
objects are necessarily intentional
objects, and that, in Peirce’s work,
perception is centrally the issue of
reference.9 Questions (i) and (iii),
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I suggest, are answered by adducing the transformation of natural
perception into scientific observation. A surprising event, an
unexpected appearance—think of
Alexander Fleming and the discovery of the unknown bacterium that
was to become penicillin—incites
examination with instruments and
chemical techniques. No doubt this
process displays parallels with the
process of interpreting a spot on
the horizon, the example adduced
by Housman, but the scientific and
technical examples are illuminating in two particular respects: (i)
Fleming’s microscope and the further techniques he used for examining the properties of penicillium
are signs devised for the purposes
of inquiry; and (ii) if we take as paradigmatic the scientific examples,
rather than the natural ones, then
they bring to our attention the fact
that natural, unaided perception is
not for all that naïve or untutored.
A “brief process of education” is all
that is needed.10 We at least ask a
question: What is this? We know
that we do not know.
The spatial metaphor that
underpins much of empiricism
and beyond that tradition, the millennial debates in metaphysics,
determines a form of the issue that
Peirce tried tirelessly to dismantle,
though the traditional language of
philosophy sometimes betrays him:
How do the things outside our cranium come to form the contents
of our minds? The inside–outside

dichotomy determines the ideal–
real dilemma and hence the fantasy
of perfect truth, knowledge that
allegedly mirrors nature. I have
discerned this metaphor in vestigial
form in Housman’s chapter 7, and I
also discern it in his chapter 5: Did
Peirce, he asks, “have a vision of a
reality that functions as an extramental condition not exhausted
by the interpretants that render it
intelligible?” (80, my emphasis).
The inexhaustible condition of
all thought in general is “externality” (98, my emphasis). I point this
out not to rebuke Housman, but
to note how persistent the standard language of philosophy is in
the face of attempts to change it.
Peirce’s attempt to change it lies in
his reworking of the dilemmas of
knowledge in terms of time. This
is clear in Peirce’s choice of vocabulary in his account of the two objects
of semeiosis: they are immediate
and dynamic, the former registered
in one sign event whose interpretation is provisional, already inciting
the next, the latter mobile, its ontology, we might say, that of cosmic
time. Housman does a formidable
job in teasing out this issue, arguing persuasively as he does so that
Peirce’s is a “process philosophy”:
“what is knowable as reality is temporally spread as or in sequences of
events” (77).
We do not need to ask what is
purportedly internal and external
to the mind, or to thought, and
indeed our authors avoid the trap

ON CONVERSATIONS ON PEIRCE
laid by the metaphor in their usage
in chapter 3, asking instead what is
outside the human and outside its
constructs. If there are two dimensions to reality, as Peirce insists,
they are governed by—or stretched
between—human and cosmic
time, our knowledge of the object
being limited by and to the former
(whether the micro time of perception or the macro time of history),
but always set against the latter,
which is, in Housman’s felicitous
phrase, “the infinite escape from
closure on the part of interpretation” (99). The consequence of not
grasping this is the “degeneration
of pragmatism,” those versions of
pragmatism that confine themselves to human affairs.11 Any such
confinement might well conclude
that conversation is all there is.
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difficulties involved in this position,
see Christopher Hookway, Peirce,
Arguments of the Philosophers, ed.
Ted Honderich (London: Routledge,
1985), chap. 5. Sandra Rosenthal’s
solution is to construe “infallible”
in such contexts as meaning that “it
does not profess anything” (“Peirce’s
Pragmatic Account of Perception,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Peirce:
Issues and Complications, ed. Cheryl
Misak, Cambridge Companions to
Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004], 193–213, quotation on 198).
3. These are available in the Collected
Papers (1932) as well as in The Essential
Peirce (1998), but can also be consulted
in a stand-alone edition: Pragmatism
as a Principle and Method of Right
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on
Pragmatism by Charles Sanders Peirce,
ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1997).
4. Hookway, Peirce, 166.
5. Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic
Account,” 211 (my emphasis).
6. Hookway, Peirce, 165.
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NOTES
1. Manley Thompson, The Pragmatic
Philosophy of C. S. Peirce (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953).
2. Peirce sometimes states that the percept
is infallible. For a discussion of the

7. Ibid., 194. Rosenthal is referring to an
earlier discussion by Housman than
the one contained in the book under
review.
8. Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic
Account,” 201.
9. Hookway, Peirce, 157.
10. Peirce, quoted in ibid., 163.
11. “Conversation” is only a subset of
semeiosis for Peirce. On this point,
I refer to my debate with Jürgen
Habermas: Anne Freadman, The
Machinery of Talk: Charles Peirce and
the Sign Hypothesis, Cultural Memory
in the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2004), 216–22.

